The most obvious form of government control involves the ability to impose regulations on how online game companies develop and operate their games; however, governmental influence also takes place through informal relationships and by efforts to shape values and norms. China, the country with the highest absolute number of online game players in the world, as well as an authoritarian government, provides an interesting context to study how real-world political, cultural, and economic issues influence the online game industry.
This article focuses on the influence and development of governmental policies and regulations on developing and operating online games in China (excluding Hong Kong and Macao). We concentrate on the following four major questions:
1. What governmental and nongovernmental entities influence and shape online game policies and regulations in China? 2. With respect to online games, what are the Chinese government's policies and the rationale behind them, and how have they developed over time? 3. What has characterized the interactions between different policies and their implementation? 4. How have the development and operation of online games been influenced by these policies and regulations?
We discuss the structure and growth of China's online game industry and examine three overarching Chinese governmental policy fields affecting online games: (a) technonationalism, (b) control of information, and (c) social fears and pragmatic nationalism. We show the historical development of these policies and discuss the effect these policies and regulations have on organizations and communities outside the Chinese government.
Research on the Chinese online game industry poses many problems, not least of all being the Chinese government's control over a number of information sources. We have tried to compensate for some of these concerns by carefully evaluating the different empirical sources used and including a broad range of sources from within and outside China, including interviews conducted with industry representatives. Other principal sources are press articles, statistics, surveys, trade magazines, company annual reports, official speeches, industry reports, and nongovernmental organizations.
Games and Culture
The growth of an underlying technological infrastructure, in the form of broadband connectivity, Internet cafés, and PCs, has been a prerequisite for the growth of online games in China. However, the relationship has been clearly mutually beneficial. In recent years, PC usage in China has increased rapidly, and by 2005 an estimated 67.4 million PCs were in use (Gartner, 2006) . Although the penetration in major cities is considerably higher, the aggregate PC penetration in China was only 5.2 per 100 persons in 2005. This figure was still far behind other major game markets in 
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Number of players (million) Revenues (million) the region, such as Korea (36.1), Taiwan (43.5), and Japan (50.8) (Gartner, 2006) . After some initial hesitation, the Chinese government embraced the Internet (Endeshaw, 2004; Zhang, 2006) . The spread of broadband access, considered especially important for online games, occurred in China a few years after Korea but has escalated since 2002 ( Figure 2 ). The Internet cafés provided important infrastructure for the growth of online games in China by providing cheap access and an important social and cultural venue. Despite several regulatory barriers imposed on the Chinese Internet café market, such popular venues have continued to complement Internet connection at home, rather than posing outright competition (China Internet Network Information Center [CNNIC], various years; Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Markle Foundation [CASS], 2005; Cody, 2007; "Logging on," 2005) . Other factors such as the underdeveloped entertainment market in China, the relatively high barrier to piracy compared to offline games, and the comparatively low cost per hour of online games as entertainment have also promoted industry growth.
A noticeable growth in Chinese online games has also occurred in recent years. As of 2006, domestically developed online games constituted 65% of the total revenue (IDC, 2007) ; a rapid increase from the estimated 15% market share in (iResearch, 2005 .
1 At first, most Chinese companies were only operators, primarily licensing Korean games. Although they lagged behind their foreign counterparts in development capabilities, they soon developed capabilities for operation (Pacific Epoch, 2006) . And this gap between Chinese and foreign companies has since decreased (Pacific Epoch, 2006) . Recently, efforts to export Chinese online games to other Asian countries have increased; however, it is too early to evaluate the results.
The business model of online games in China has changed during the past few years. In the past, the payment with point cards per hour of game play dominated; however, in recent years the "in-game item" business model-whereby the basic gaming service is free but players pay for additional in-game virtual items and services-has come to the fore. In 2006, more than 60% of the total revenue of online games in China was derived from the "in-game item" business model (IDC, 2007) .
Chinese Governmental Policies Concerning Online Games
The political system of contemporary China has been described as "neo-Leninism" (Pei, 2006) and "Leninist corporatism" (Hutton, 2007) . These views emphasize the fact that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) still acts as a vanguard and controls the economy; however, a more open stance toward the global economy and new, influential social elites have emerged. Research findings concerning the influence of the Chinese government on the Internet and media industries tend to be situated between two extremes: a top-down process, whereby the CCP has extensive power to design and implement policies according to its objectives, and a negotiated process, whereby power is highly fragmented and influenced by a number of actors at different levels with conflicting interests (Qiu & Liuning, 2005) .
The online game industry is a complex web of activities, and the nature and potential of top-down governmental power varies considerably. In the current study, we take the middle ground, arguing that three overarching policy fields have come to characterize the Chinese government's stance toward the online game industry, which has reshaped and introduced new aspects of these policy goals in an ongoing trial-and-error process. Policy implementation is subsequently shaped by a number of actors within and outside the CCP.
The Chinese government therefore exercises its power to influence and shape the online game industry in a number of ways. By comparing a number of screening systems for games in different countries, China imposed the most extensive censorship (Kim & Park, 2005) . Steven Lukes (2004) identified three dimensions whereby governmental power achieves its goal (each dimension adding new categories): (a) decision making exercised through formal institutions; (b) the ability to set the agenda, for formal and informal institutions employing authority, force influence, coercion, inducements, propaganda, and manipulation; and (c) the ability to use power to shape people's preferences, wants, beliefs, and perceptions through values, norms, and ideologies, thereby frustrating their "real" interests. In studies of the Chinese online games industry, all these dimensions should be taken into account.
Three Policy Fields Regarding Online Games Technonationalism
Technonationalistic policies aim initially to increase the competitiveness of domestic companies in specific fields in the large domestic Chinese market and thereby provide a growth environment for subsequent competition in the world market (Kang & Segal, 2006; Qiang, 2007) . One of the rationales behind this development is a desire to rapidly catch up with technological leaders and thus achieve the economic growth to build and sustain the political base of the CCP (Liew, 2005) . One example of this strategy is the high-tech "863" program that China launched in 1986 (Feigenbaum, 2003; Ministry of Science and Technology [MOST], 2006) . Previously, the plans were focused on hardware technology; however, during the past decade, the software applications have increased (Feigenbaum, 2003) .
China's contemporary technonationalism has been labeled "neotechnonationalism" (Suttmeier & Xiangkui, 2004) or "open technonationalism" (Kang & Segal, 2006) to emphasize a form of technonationalism that China has adapted to the global market economy and World Trade Organization (WTO) requirements during the past decade (Lieberthal, 2006 (OECD, 2005) . The development of domestic technical standards has also been an important method (Suttmeier, 2005; Suttmeier & Xiangkui, 2004) . Table 1 describes the Chinese government's technonationalistic policies in relation to online games.
Information Control
The Internet's ability to facilitate decentralized information and horizontal communication posed a major challenge for CCP influence, based on centralized control of information and vertical communication (Rawnsley, 2006; Zhang, 2006) . At the same time, the CCP acknowledged the commercial possibilities of the Internet and its ability to contribute to economic growth. The CCP thus gave priority to the development of a cost-effective policy that could control Internet information, while not restraining its economic potential. In a study based on interviews with Chinese Internet regulators, Zhang (2006) found they employed five strategic measures for information control: (a) legislation, (b) blocking, (c) build-up (increase "healthy" content), (d) education (propagate the use of "healthy" content), and (e) self-regulation. These strategic measures have also characterized the control of the online game industry. According to Zhang (2006) , the emphasis on self-censorship was one characteristic that differentiated Internet policy from earlier policies. Because of the decentralized nature of the Internet, the self-censorship imposed on Chinese Internet companies was cost-effective and complemented centrally imposed governmental censorship (Hachigian, 2001) . Information control has been pursued more vigorously in recent years, and significant resources have been put into developing new technologies of control (Zhang, 2006) . Some (real-name registration, "antiaddiction" software) are built into the games themselves and thereby contribute to the architecture of control (Lessig, 2006) . Another change in the information control mechanism is the increased emphasis among regulators on proactive, rather than merely reactive, regulatory policies (Zhang, 2006) . For the online game industry, this has meant increasing efforts to discourage online games with "unhealthy" content from reaching the market, through government-controlled screening committees and a number of licensing procedures. Table 2 describes the Chinese government's policies of information control in relation to online games.
Pragmatic Nationalism and Social Concerns
The effect of online games on Chinese social and nationalistic values has been of great concern to the CCP and has greatly influenced its online game policies. The CCP often intertwines both of these values to legitimate its role as the harborer of national, cultural, and family values in China. Thus, it is difficult to separate the national ideological interests of the CCP from the impact of social concerns stemming from the emergence of a new medium. These social concerns have followed the general pattern of the reception of any new medium's effect on youth (Wartella & Reeves, 1983; Williams, 2003) . This includes fears that (a) the medium displaces other constructive activities, (b) there are adverse health effects of the new medium, and (c) various social ills are associated with the medium. Consequently, games easily become "touchstones for larger struggles within the culture" (Williams, 2003, p. 543 ). In such a struggle, the different interests involved, and the power each possesses, are important in shaping the process. These social fears have been shaped by interest groups outside the CCP, as well as groups inside the Party. Although the CCP shares families' social concerns, it is primarily driven by an interest in strengthening its own legitimacy. Because of the CCP's formal and informal control over the media, it could potentially steer the debate regarding online games and social concerns, making it less open and largely biased. State-owned media act partially as a propaganda instrument for the government by frequently publishing public announcements by CCP officials and agencies, while censoring competing views (Esarey, 2006) . However, it is not a system of complete state control. Within the confines of censorship, for example, state media have some abilities to express different opinions, such as those from groups outside the Party.
As online games grew in importance, the CCP also realized its potential as a propaganda instrument to shape youth's preferences. These values that CCP communicates to online game users are predominately based on the pragmatic patriotic and nationalistic values through which the Party has legitimized its power during the past decade, following the abandonment of traditional communist ideology. Suisheng Zhao (2005) defined this pragmatic nationalism as one that "considers the nation as a territorial-political unit, gives the Communist state the responsibility to speak in the name of the nation and demands that citizens subordinate their individual interests to China's national ones" (p. 134). In this regard, it is state centric and "identifies China closely with the CCP, rendering the two indistinguishable" (Zhao, 2005, p. 135) . Zhang (2006, p. 284 ) also found support for belief in nationalistic values in her interviews with Chinese Internet regulators. Table 3 describes the Chinese government's policies reflecting social concerns and pragmatic nationalism in relation to online games.
Complementary and Contradictory Elements of the Three Policies
The interaction effect between the overarching policies is interesting, and in this regard three ideal alternatives are possible: (a) policies contradict each other, (b) complement each other, or (c) are unrelated ( Figure 3 ).
To strike a balance between conflicting policies has provided a constant challenge for the CCP. For the Chinese government, policy problems with online games regulations are clear. The government has incentives of maximizing its legitimacy based on information control, economic growth through technonationalism, and maintenance of Chinese nationalistic values. In some instances, these policies are complementary; however, in many other instances they are conflicting, giving rise to friction and disagreement and at first glance appear to be ambiguous policy. At the same time, their legitimacy is also put under pressure by the need to find support among a broader base of Chinese citizens. In this environment, the government has tried to steer the debate surrounding online games so as to emphasize complementary, rather than contradictory, policy elements. Furthermore, it has also tried to steer the debate to give the impression that CCP policies and beliefs are consistent with the general public. Wartella & Reeves, 1983; Williams, 2003; Zhang, 2006; Zhao, 2005. Note: CCP = Chinese Communist Party.
Information Control, Pragmatic Nationalism, and Social Concerns
The belief that Internet content should be controlled has broad support among Chinese citizens. A 2005 study of citizens in five major Chinese cities found that as many as 82% of respondents thought it "necessary" or "very necessary" that the Internet should be managed or controlled (CASS, 2005) . However, when it comes to the issue of what kind of Internet content should be regulated, some areas have strong support, but others very little (Figure 4) . Control of morally controversial content, such as pornography (85%) and violence (73%), received very high support, whereas there was less support (16%) for the control of online games. The control of political content (8%) most directly associated with CCP policies of information control received least support. 
Control of information
This scenario had some important implications for CCP practice of control. Online games were not in themselves seen by citizens as dangerous enough to warrant control. Nor was information control of political issues important for the CCP seen as necessary. However, if online game policies of information control could successfully be connected to morally controversial topics such as pornography and violence, control mechanisms would have broader support. Although it was not part of the survey, "addiction" has also been found to have relatively broad support for control (iResearch, 2006, p. 23) . Tsui (2005) argued that the topic of Internet "addiction" was so controversial that it was "making it not only acceptable to the public, but even creating a demand for regulation" (pp. 183-184) . This is also what characterized CCP policy development. The CCP constantly tried, in the public mind, to connect online games with what were perceived as morally objectionable activities. When 
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Percentage presenting measures for information control, the CCP did so in connection with control measures that, they argued, should curb morally objective aspects of online games.
Technonationalism in Relation to Other Policies
At the core of the relationship between information control and the realization of economic growth through technonationalism is the widespread concern that the former could stifle the latter. The difficulties involved for the CCP in trying to gain information control over the Internet, while promoting economic growth, was recently emphasized by President Hu Jintao who, in a speech to government officials, emphasized the need to "ensure that one hand grasps development while one hand grasps administration" ("China's Communists," 2007) and argued "Whether we can cope with the Internet is a matter that affects the development of socialist culture, the security of information, and the stability of the state" ("President Hu Jintao," 2007). The difficulty in pursuing innovation is due to the number of possibilities for experimentation in terms of content and the fact that game design is restricted. As Lieberthal (2006) argued, the system also disadvantages innovative companies in relation to those that are more successful at steering their way through the bureaucratic process. At a microlevel, this has led to the promotion of some managers based on political networking rather than professional individual talent (Lieberthal, 2006) .
Social concerns regarding online games are also difficult to combine with the realization of the full economic potential of technonationalism. Limitations on playing time and the closing down of Internet cafés are two such factors that have the potential to directly affect the growth of the industry. Moreover, the poor image that government control has imposed on the industry has the potential of limiting the demand for online games and creating problems for Chinese online game companies when they recruit personnel. There are also complementary elements. Pragmatic nationalism promotes games with Chinese content, which domestic companies have a comparative advantage in producing.
The Policy Environment of Online Games The CCP and Governmental Ministries
The majority of policies and regulations affecting the Chinese online game industry derive from government ministries. These are all grouped under the State Council that, in turn, is influenced by the Politburo and the National People's Congress. As depicted in Figure 5 , a number of ministries claim to have jurisdiction over the industry; however, three play the most prominent role: General Administration of Press and Publications (GAPP) that can regulate, license, censor, or ban media; the Ministry of Culture (MOC) that regulates cultural content; and the Ministry of Information Industry (MII) that regulates and licenses Internet content providers, telecommunications, and software. MOC and GAPP have partially been rivals in exercising their authority over the industry. In addition to regulatory ministries, the CCP-led nationwide youth organization, the CYLC (Communist Youth League of China) has played an important role in online game policies by "educating" people and helping to build up "healthy" games in recent years.
Interest groups formally outside CCP, such as online game companies, players, families, schools, and universities, are also important in the online game policy environment. Of the non-Chinese actors, WTO has had the largest influence. Prior to its entrance into the WTO in 2001, China made some major changes in its legal system, (Lieberthal, 2006; OECD, 2005) .
Evolution of Governmental Policies of Online Game Development and Operation in China Regulation Preceding the Growth of Online Games
Before the breakthrough of the MMOG games in 2001, electronic gaming in China primarily consisted of PC games at Internet cafés and at home, arcades, and illegal video games.
2 Internet cafés and video game arcades rapidly became subject to increasing governmental regulation and control. Video game arcades in China were subjected to new regulations in 2000, and many were closed down. In a debate with many similarities to the one that would later involve Internet cafés and online games, arcades were alleged to be a source of video game "addiction," illegal gambling, negative influence on schoolwork, and an unhealthy environment in general ("China Fights," 2000; "China to Overhaul," 2000; "Recreational Arcades," 2000). However, widespread corruption at the local level made enforcement of these regulations difficult ("Shanghai Cops," 2006).
The Internet cafés that had started to become common in major cities in 1997 were subject to regulation by a number of governmental ministries by late 1998 (Qiu & Liuning, 2005) Network security was the initial regulatory concern by the government; however, the public debate rapidly became focused on moral and social issues involving exposure to violence and pornography and Internet "addiction" ("China Cleans," 2001; "China Internet," 2001; Golub & Lingley, in press ).
Regulation of Online Game Companies
During the second half of 2003, the Chinese government increased its attention and changed its official policy toward the online game industry. Online games had been affected by a number of existing general regulations regarding Internet operations and publication activities, and in July 2003 a new regulation required that all Internet cultural content must be preapproved by the MOC (Table 4) .
However, specific policies and regulatory measures for the online game industry soon followed. The policies that were previously characterized by information control and social concerns (Golub & Lingley, in press) changed to policies in which online games. Sets up screening committee to step up examination of online games. Only games with import authorization from MOC could be imported; these would be games with content in accord with Chinese national conditions and were perceived as bringing "positive effects to young people's mentality." National Online Game Publishing Project. Support for the development of 100 "healthy" Chinese (and Taiwanese) online games in 5 years through support in administration, taxation, and funding. In August 2007, the third set of games for support was chosen (61 games supported thus far). Notice requiring imported online games to obtain approval from GAPP and State Copyright Bureau for operation in China. National clean-up campaign against illegal online games.
Opinions on the Development and Management of
Online Games. Included regulation prohibiting people younger than age 18 years from playing online games in which players are allowed to kill other players' characters (PK). Require companies to implement anti-addiction modifications to game rules and develop systems for identity certification. Trial standards for development of "antifatigue system." The development of antifatigue system is proposed to reduce experience points gained after 3 hr and eliminated after 5 hr.
(continued)
games were linked to technonationalistic policies and pragmatic nationalism. Based on the press coverage, the new stance toward the online game industry was orchestrated and supported by a range of Chinese governmental ministries and is, therefore, best characterized as a coordinated policy initiative, rather than a manifestation of the disparate interests of different CCP ministries. Table 4 provides a timeline of the most important governmental policies concerning the development and operation of online games in China. Confirms that the real-name ID card identification and anti-addiction would be put into place during the period ending July 16. GAPP issued a warning to 20 companies that had not yet adopted the system at the end of July.
Source: "China to Break," 2004; "China Scores," 2007; "Game Makers'," 2003; "Interview: Pearl Research's," 2007; iResearch, 2006; Netease, 2007; "Online Game Players," 2006; Pacific Epoch, 2006; Perfect World, 2007; "Q&A: Niko," 2007; Shanda, 2006 In a proposal to the fifth session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in March 2002, a former vice minister of culture, Xu Wenbo, put forward the political blueprint for future policy, "I suggest the State regard online games as an industry and foster the growth of domestic businesses, while strengthening controls" ("It's a Tough Game," 2002). The first of these policies was the founding of the China Game Publishers Association (CGPA) by GAPP in July 2003, a game industry "working committee" that tied the government closer to the industry ("Game Makers'," 2003) . Kou Xiaowei from GAPP officially declared the government's new official view of the industry (also taking on the role to speak for Chinese people), "We must say the industry is facing many difficulties, but its image in the eyes of the government and people has improved" ("Game Makers'," 2003). The state-owned People's Daily described the government's shift: "Long scorned and despised as 'electronic heroin' in China, online games now teach people history and culture" ("Chinese- Made Online," 2003) .
In October 2003, online game technology was listed in the Ministry of Science & Technology (MOST) "863" technonationalistic program. It was put forward by the MOST as driven by a strong desire to increase the share of domestically developed, Chinese online games. The first major "863" project was an online game engine for Chinese online game companies, a reflection of the technonationalistic focus concerning ownership of key standards in China (Suttmeier, 2005) . Furthermore, the MOC promised preferential tax policies for domestic developers of Chinese online games; at the same time, policies of information control were strengthened by the establishment of a new screening commission in 2004 to deal with online games purported to have "unhealthy" content. It was not only an increase but also an expansion of censorship. According to a MOC manager, the new strategy meant they attached importance not only to the content of the games but also to their "deep values" ("Chinese Official," 2006) .
GAPP kept its promise to domestic development companies by giving them preferential treatment for online publication licenses. For GAPP, the new policy also included features of pragmatic nationalism, as the government saw the possibility to push forward a project to "encourage game developers to create more games with Chinese cultural content, rather than borrowing from Japanese, South Korean or American cultures" (" Visitors Flock," 2004) . In June 2004, the National Online Game Publishing Project established the goal of supporting the development of 100 "healthy" online games based on Chinese national culture within a period of 5 years, with preferential tax policies and treatments. GAPP initially framed its policy to show that it took social concerns regarding online gaming seriously ("China to Break," 2004) . GAPP also initiated cooperation with the major Chinese game company Shanda in 2005 to develop a line of nationalistic online games, "Chinese Heroes," to "teach players about Chinese ethics" ("Chinese Heroes," 2006) . This is an example of the pragmatic nature of Chinese companies such as Shanda helping to produce nationalistic propaganda, while also initiating licensing with Disney for online game content.
At the same time, China increased formal and informal barriers to deter foreign game developers from entering the Chinese market. These new impediments included the screening commission set up by the MOC in 2004, as well as subsequent new requirements for the approval of imported online games from GAPP and the State Copyright Bureau (Table 4; "China Scores," 2007; Korean Embassy, 2004; Shanda, 2006; Webzen, 2007) . In practice, the new regulations meant that it was only possible for foreign companies to gain approval if they had established a joint venture with a Chinese company (Korean Embassy, 2004) . The interpretation of the regulations surrounding online games was usually much tougher for foreign companies than for Chinese game developers ("Q&A: Niko," 2007). After 2004, the annual number of foreign-made games imported to China more than halved ("China Scores," 2007). The strategy of only allowing joint ventures was in line with technonationalist policies in China, whereby joint ventures with high-tech companies would enable the rise of domestic Chinese companies through knowledge transfer. However, foreign developers feared that the need to create joint ventures would enable the transfer of core technologies and imitation of IP (Korean Embassy, 2004) . In a recent announcement concerning the government's involvement in the Chinese online game industry, Kou Xiaowei from GAPP described this technonationalistic strategy: the government should, in the first place, encourage enterprises to be more self-disciplined and pay attention to professional ethics and fair competition. After that, they should join hands to break down foreign enterprises' monopolies by creating original online games and building a platform for exchange between Chinese and foreign enterprises. Only by holding more exchanges, can Chinese enterprises gain valuable experience from abroad. ("China's Internet," 2007) The strict regulation coincided with a policy of tighter information control of online games, whereby Chinese authorities had a stranglehold on the industry. In 2006, GAPP announced new strict registration requirements and monthly monitoring reports of imported online games ("China Tightening," 2006). The new policies were framed in response to a rash of problems regarding imported online games that included pornography, violence, and "sensitive religious material" ("China Tightening," 2006) .
A number of other regulations from Chinese governmental authorities have attempted to come to grips with the social concerns regarding excessive online game playing among youth. Examples are GAPP's development of an antifatigue system that limited playing time of online games in 2005 and the consideration of a rating system for online games in 2006. Recent announcements concerning the implementation of realname registration of online games and the regulation of real-money trade (RMT) have also been influenced by policies of information control.
The issue of RMT and transferability into yuan (the currency of China) captured the interest of regulators because of the rapid increase of virtual currencies in online games and other Internet services ("Virtual Money," 2006) . Chinese online game companies jointly called for clear rules regarding RMT issues. The RMT regulation, for example, banned the exchange of virtual capital for real-world currency and limited the former to the purchase of virtual items and assets. When the regulation was announced in 2007, social concerns regarding the use of virtual capital for gambling, the potential for money laundering, and the threat to the financial stability and hegemony of the yuan were put forward as supporting arguments. The new law enabled Chinese online game companies to continue the "in-game" business model from which they received the majority of their revenue. With the implementation of strong regulatory policies, the Chinese government has encouraged the flow of capital, from domestic and foreign sources, toward domestic development. In this regard, different kinds of legally available options to finance domestic game development through the in-game business model and advertisements have been encouraged ("Virtual World," 2007) .
The CYLC claims to have around 70 million members in the age range 14 to 28 years throughout China ("State and Political Parties," 2005) and, for its most devoted members, provides a career path to elite positions within the CCP bureaucracy and business positions where political contacts are important (Bian, Xiaoling, & Logan, 2001) . Lacking formal regulatory powers, the CYLC has used the second and third dimension of power (Lukes, 2004) to "educate" by setting the agenda for discussion of online games and to shape preferences through the large-scale, extensive reach and resources of the organization (see Table 5 ). Its leaders share parents' interests in avoiding activities that pose a threat to study discipline; however, at the same time, they have a strong interest in uniting and leading young people according to CCP principles, promoting patriotism, and ensuring their members have "lofty ideals, moral integrity and [a] high sense of discipline" ("State and Political Parties," 2005) . Since 2004, CYLC has cooperated with universities and also conducts "classification," "research," and "surveys" regarding online games frequently presented by the media as research "facts." Representatives from CYLC and associated projects have forcefully promoted the alleged connection between online games and morally controversial activities. At the same time, they have put generous resources into trying to create nationalistic Chinese online games in cooperation with private companies.
Chinese Communist Party External Groups and Online Game Regulations Online Game Companies and Regulatory Influence
Despite the fact that China entered the WTO in 2001 and its legal system is under development, there are a number of issues for businesses trying to operate within the autocratic Chinese system. OECD (2005) stated that the role of the state, governing tools, relations between levels of government, and the institutional framework for Ernkvist, Ström / Chinese Online Game Industry 117 market forces require further reforms and that "the application of laws and regulations is not always systematic, sometimes biased by corrupt arrangements or reflecting the local balance of interest " (p. 26) Jurisdictions between governmental ministries regulating online games often overlap; thus, requirements can be vague and inconsistent between ministries and regulations. As a result, Chinese online game companies do business within a legal system where "substantial uncertainties exist regarding the interpretation and implementation of current and any future PRC laws and regulations applicable to the online game industry" (Shanda, 2006, p. 24) . There is a constant need for online game companies to monitor regulatory changes. Faced with these uncertainties, a strong dependency relationship with specific governmental authorities and a certain degree of self-censorship has resulted because games are developed and operated, not according to clear laws, but by following the interpretative practice of the CCP governmental ministries. One Chinese online game company manager expressed uncertainties about the regulatory situation:
There are some regulations that [sic] we know what is right and what is wrong, but there is no guarantee, for example, there is a law saying this is not allowed there. If you make a game and you make sure those prohibited items are not in the game it is nothing determined that this is okay. You will always start something that no one mentioned is Many regulatory ministries have far-reaching authority to deny, revoke, or delay licenses for game companies that do not act in accordance with the regulations. For other activities, it is the role of the local legal authorities to ensure that regulations are followed, and these efforts vary greatly (see Qiu & Liuning, 2005) . The enforcing of regulations has been shown to be weak when dealing with extensive activities spread over a number of actors at the local level, as has been the case with illegal Internet cafés and piracy (OECD, 2005; Qiu & Liuning, 2005) . The regular use of national campaigns, whereby ministries could make statuary examples that show determination and focus on specific problems were not always efficient and, more often than not, serve as temporary measures.
Another issue of great importance for the online game industry involves IP rights. Despite an improved formal legal system addressing IP rights (OECD, 2005) , China has experienced severe problems in securing them (Stevenson-Yang & DeWoskin, 2005) . Arguably, it undermines the desire by foreign companies to transfer technology and hurts domestic incentives in the pursuit of innovation. In the online game industry, piracy by online game servers (Liu, 2004) and the imitation of popular games by Chinese game companies provide two major legal challenges.
A number of IP infringement cases have emerged in the industry; however, because of relatively weak legal protection, the verdict has not always been favorable for the victimized firm ("Attack of the Clones," 2006; Pacific Epoch, 2006) . The imitation of popular online games has helped many Chinese online game companies to grow and has compensated for their comparatively lower development capabilities. However, as the focus has shifted toward domestic development of online games in recent years, these problems have posed a barrier for Chinese online game companies to develop their own innovative and original product.
Numerous efforts have been made by the CCP to deal with pirate online game servers, including a national cleanup campaign against illegal online games initiated by a number of ministries during 2005 (Table 4 ). The government's effort in this area is understandable, as pirated servers hamper growth and provide a channel of online game play outside the government's regulatory control. However, the weak enforcement power exercised by these ministries at the local level, coupled with corruption, has resulted in only a few convictions publicized in the media as cautionary examples.
In this complex legal environment, the importance of personal connections and contacts-guanxi-cannot be underestimated. The basis of guanxi is personal trust, rather than trust in the system. Few laws are currently enforced because personal interpretations often affect outcomes. This means that guanxi is helpful in dealing with the bureaucracy. Various layers of government have control over resource distribution, investment size, industrial structure, loans, business formation, and support functions in strategic sectors. Guanxi can thus help to reduce political risk regarding sudden changes of the regulatory system or fees introduced at different political levels and also includes the common (but not accepted) form of guanxi designed to influence governmental officials in their decisions and procedures, often involving corruption (Guthrie, 1998; Luo, 2000; OECD, 2005) . For the online game industry, it is vital to know how to best utilize the possibility of a guanxi relationship in relation to government officials (authors' interviews). One of the most important and complex issues involves game approval by the authorities. Because this is not a clear and completely transparent process, personal connections with government officials and the bureaucracy are vital for fast-tracking the process. The reply from a Chinese game company manager, when asked whether it takes a long time to get a game approved, illustrates this point: From the current study, it has not been possible to draw any definite conclusions as to whether guanxi influenced the legislative process in the creation of new regulations. At least in some instances, game companies have been able to influence the regulatory agenda (Berger, 2001) .
3 Because of the close guanxi relationship between major Chinese online game companies and the government, these companies are committed to social responsibility and other issues raised by the government to maintain the valuable relationship. However, this is problematic for both. Companies want to promote their games but on the other hand need to work cooperatively with the government to avoid losing important connections. Social responsibilities and commitments on behalf of the online game companies are in most instances informally understood consequences of the regulatory structure.
Chinese game companies have an ambiguous stance toward CCP policies. In publicly expressed opinions, company representatives are quick to declare that their company takes "social responsibility" and the creation of a "healthy" online game culture seriously. At the same time, issues regarding their corporate image and governmental relationships play a significant role. Our interviews indicate that some Chinese game company managers were also critical of the government's involvement:
Policies of information control and social fear have, coupled with an autocratic system, made the negative image of the industry a barrier to further growth. One example is the difficulty online game companies have in attracting qualified personnel from the best universities, because of the image of the industry.
Parents, Teachers, and Players
For most Chinese parents with one child, the immense pressure on the child to focus and succeed within the Chinese educational system means that online games are seen as a threat that removes them from their studies and in general provides an unhealthy environment (Golub & Lingley, in press ). Representatives of schools and universities, to a large degree, share these interests.
A number of disagreements regarding policies have been expressed by the game players. Through virtual communities, online protests, and surveys, they have developed a group power and have been able to voice their opinions against new regulations and claims of deviant behavior. One example was the player protest against the antifatigue system that forced GAPP to rework and postpone the system and apply it to players younger than age 18 years ("Online Game Players," 2006). The real-name system the GAPP proposed in 2006 created worries over privacy and thus extensive cheating by players. Although these examples could be interpreted as libertarian activism on the behalf of players against repressive information control, the protest is better seen not simply in terms of overarching democratic political goals but as a defense of their right to play.
Some of the most extensive protests and condemnation among online game players in China have been against activities that insult their nationalistic sentiments toward China as a nation, Chinese culture, or family values. The most famous of these cases involved anti-Japanese nationalistic sentiments in the online game Westward Journey (Jenkins, 2006) and a case of extramarital sex by a WoW player ("The Most Famous," 2006). If players had knowledge of how the censorship functions, it is likely that it would cause more protest. When the players realized that the Burning Crusade expansion pack for WoW would not include bones and skeletons, as in other countries, protest soon followed ("China Censors," 2007).
Concluding Remarks
The Chinese online game industry is deeply enmeshed in, and shaped by, the political environment of the autocratic Chinese system. Thus, online games are subject to three major national policies: (a) technonationalism, (b) information control, and (c) social fears and pragmatic nationalism. This article describes the structure of the influence of the CCP on the online game industry in China, the major ministries involved, the interaction of different interest groups in China, and the role of the legal system and social relationships, especially guanxi.
